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Fight or Flight: The Ninth Circuit’s  
Advancement of Textualism  
During an Era of Intentionalism  
in United States v. Lozoya 
Abstract 
 
The modern complexities of global interaction and accessibility 
have recently forced some federal courts to reconsider standards for 
determining proper venue for criminal defendants who commit 
offenses while engaged in transportation, particularly those 
involving interstate commerce and crimes spanning multiple 
districts.  These courts’ application of two adversarial schools of 
statutory interpretation—textualism and intentionalism—has driven 
conflict between textualist jurisdictions adhering to the plain 
meaning of established constitutional and statutory sources, and 
intentionalist jurisdictions refraining from the “creeping absurdity” 
of establishing venue for certain in-transit offenses under the literal 
meaning of such provisions. 
This Note endorses the sensibility and superiority of the Ninth 
Circuit’s textualist approach to statutory interpretation in 
determining the proper venue for an in-flight assault in United 
States v. Lozoya.  Specifically, this Note covers the significance of 
the Lozoya decision in exercising statutory interpretation that was 
faithful to well-settled traditions of venue law without heeding to the 
accessible but superficial understanding of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) that 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent adjudication concerning the proper jurisdiction for in-flight 
criminal offenses has taken a permissive approach in authorizing venue, often 
causing venue to land outside of the scope of well-established constitutional 
and federal sources.1  As a central tenet of our republican system, venue 
primarily pertains to the district where a crime may be brought to trial so as 
to protect the defendant from a trial in a district inconvenient or unfair to him.2  
Broad readings of statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3238, 
while interpreted in the pursuit of justice,3 have given effect to venue in any 
number of districts traversed during the course of the flight and the district in 
which the plane lands.  Under circumstances such as those confronted in 
United States v. Lozoya, the Ninth Circuit recognized that such broad statutory 
interpretation dilutes the plain meaning of these statutes and undermines 
respected “notions of justice” rooted in practiced constitutional and federal 
venue provisions.4 
In Lozoya, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with the challenge of 
determining where the proper venue should be for the trial of a defendant 
charged with an assault that occurred during a flight from Minneapolis to Los 
Angeles.5  The court took a contrasting approach to interpret 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3237(a) and addressed how linchpin clauses, such as offenses “involving the 
use of . . . transportation in interstate commerce” and “continuing offense[s],” 
were intended to operate by their plain meaning.6  Both Judge Smith’s 
majority opinion and Judge Owens’s dissent contemplated whether the court’s 
holding aligned with the absurdity doctrine, which instructs courts that 
statutes “should be interpreted to avoid absurd results, unless a contrary 
 
 1. See United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that venue was 
proper for crimes committed on an airplane in the district where the airplane lands); United States v. 
Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding that venue was proper for crimes committed on 
an airplane in any district through which the plane travels during the flight). 
 2. See Megan O’Neill, Comment, Extra Venues for Extraterritorial Crimes?  18 U.S.C. § 3238 
and Cross-Border Criminal Activity, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1425, 1448 (2013). 
 3. See United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 349–350 (11th Cir. 1982) (“We construe any 
violation of this statute which occurs on some form of transportation in interstate or foreign commerce 
to be a ‘continuing violation’ under 18 U.S.C. § 3237[.] . . . [The statute] is a catchall provision 
designed to prevent a crime which has been committed in transit from escaping punishment for lack 
of venue.”). 
 4. See Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd 
Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 146 (1994). 
 5. United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 6. Id. at 1239–40. 
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outcome was fully anticipated and clearly manifested by the statutory 
language or its legislative history.”7 
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit reached the correct holding in 
Lozoya in comparison to recent decisions concerning venue decided by the 
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits which allowed speculative congressional intent 
to take precedence over the plain meaning of pivotal statutory provisions.  
While the meaning of key clauses in § 3237(a) is not “plain” in the sense that 
it can be ascertained without effort, the effort given by the Ninth Circuit in 
Lozoya was necessary in order to buck the trend of allowing flawed catchall 
statutory interpretation to unjustly expand the grasp of venue determinations 
under circumstances that are already properly addressed by constitutional 
norms. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF VENUE AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
The Sixth Amendment of our Constitution laid the foundation for venue 
as a principle designed to protect a criminal defendant’s right to a fair and 
impartial trial, stating that the defendant must be prosecuted in “the state and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”8  In recent years, the 
plain meaning of this fundamental concept has been unnecessarily 
complicated by courts seeking to determine the proper venue for crimes 
committed during airplane flights.9  Modern complexities of global 
accessibility have forced some courts to reconsider standards for providing 
venue to criminal defendants charged with committing offenses while 
engaged in transportation, particularly transportation that involves interstate 
commerce and spans multiple districts.10  Courts have focused on two federal 
statutes—18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3238—in deciding venue for 
criminal offenses involving interstate transportation and crimes spanning 
multiple districts. 
18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) states that: 
 
 7. Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1006 (2006). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also FED R. CRIM. P. 18 (stating that “[u]nless a statute or these 
rules permit otherwise, the government must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was 
committed.”). 
 9. See Breitweiser v. United States, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cope, 
676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 10. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 30 (quoting S. REP. NO. 87-694, at 2–3 (1961)). 
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Except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, 
any offense against the United States begun in one district and 
completed in another, or committed in more than one district, may be 
inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such offense was 
begun, continued, or completed. 
Any offense involving use of the mails, or transportation in interstate 
or foreign commerce, is a continuing offense and, except as otherwise 
expressly provided by enactment of Congress, may be inquired of and 
prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which such 
commerce or mail matter moves.11 
Meanwhile, 18 U.S.C. § 3238 states that “[t]he trial of all offenses begun 
or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any 
particular State or district, shall be in the district in which the offender, or any 
one of two or more joint offenders, is arrested or is first brought . . . .”12 
While the statutes themselves present no conflict of law, the federal 
court’s application of two adversarial traditions of statutory interpretation 
have created absurd results under certain circumstances, which has given rise 
some to jurisdictional concerns.  The first school of thought, intentionalism, 
is premised on the presumption that Congress always acts rationally when 
creating legislation.13  “By presuming that the legislature would not intend 
absurd consequences, the court avoids the appearance that it is infringing on 
legislative supremacy when it rejects a plain meaning that would result in 
absurdity.”14  The other school of thought, textualism, refers to the principle 
that statutes should be read with strict literalism, as “only through a system of 
interpretation limited to the words of the statute can we hope to have clear and 
predictable rules . . . .”15  Nevertheless, textualism does not proceed without 
some of the flexibility expressed in intentionalism, as textualists interpret 
statutory language “by asking how ‘a skilled, objectively reasonable user of 
 
 11. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1948). 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1948). 
 13. Dougherty, supra note 4, at 136–37. 
 14. Id.  The absurdity doctrine, which entails that statutes should be interpreted to avoid absurd 
results, will be discussed in Part IV in regard to the likelihood of reaching absurd results when 
determining venue if other courts adhere to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Lozoya.  See Staszewski, 
supra note 7, at 1006. 
 15. Dougherty, supra note 4, at 133–34. 
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words’ would have understood the statutory text.”16  Both of these approaches 
to statutory interpretation will be explored within the scope of Lozoya, 
particularly in relation to 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). 
Recent federal decisions concerning the proper venue for an offense 
committed during a cross-county flight have authorized a broader scope in 
establishing venue than that landed upon by the Ninth Circuit in 2019.  In 
United States v. Breitweiser, the Eleventh Circuit held that venue for mid-air 
crimes is proper in the district where the airplane lands.17  There, in the wake 
of a sexual assault against a minor that occurred over the course of a flight 
from Houston to Atlanta, the Eleventh Circuit broadly interpreted § 3237(a) 
without inquiring as to what it truly means for an offense to “involve” the use 
of transportation.18  According to the court’s reading of the statute, “[t]o 
establish venue, the government need only show that the crime took place on 
a form of transportation in interstate commerce,” which it accomplished by 
demonstrating that the defendant committed the sexual assault on an airplane 
that ultimately landed—and consequently established venue—in Atlanta.19  
The court opined that “[i]t would be difficult if not impossible for the 
government to prove . . . exactly which federal district was beneath the plane 
when Breitweiser committed the crimes.”20 
In United States v. Cope, the Tenth Circuit clarified what a “continuing 
offense” is under § 3237(a), holding that venue for in-flight crimes is proper 
in any district through which the plane travels during the flight, including the 
district in which it lands.21  There, after navigating a flight from Austin, Texas 
to Denver, Colorado, a pilot was charged with operating a common carrier 
while under the influence of alcohol.22  The Tenth Circuit found that, as a 
result of his intoxication, the pilot had violated 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) and 
committed a “continuing offense” by operating transportation in interstate 
commerce that began in one district and was completed in another.23  
Therefore, the court held that “[v]enue is proper in any district through which 
 
 16. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2458.  In short, even if a 
statutory text does not spell out every detail, textualists interpret that statute “according to the legal 
system's accepted procedures, evidentiary rules, burdens of persuasion - and defenses.”  Id. at 2469. 
 17. United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 22. Id. at 1222. 
 23. Id. at 1225. 
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[the pilot] traveled on the flight, including the District of Colorado,” the 
district in which the flight landed.24 
However, in 2019 the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Lozoya 
created a circuit split when the court departed from the persuasive authority 
of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.25  In response to an assault committed 
during a flight, the Ninth Circuit adequately clarified what it means for an 
offense to “involve” transportation in interstate commerce, and whether or not 
such an offense should be designated as a “continuing offense.”26  The court 
held that the only proper venue for a crime committed during an airplane flight 
is the district in which the crime took place.27  The Ninth Circuit’s ruling has 
given rise to concerns as to whether a court can convincingly ascertain the 
locus delicti of the committed offense,28 and therefore whether Lozoya 
arbitrarily complicates the task of determining the proper venue for trial.29  At 
the same time, the Ninth Circuit’s adherence to a textualist reading of 
§ 3237(a), while taking the care to determine the plain meaning of the statute’s 
key language, should be lauded as an exercise of proper judicial restraint.30  
The court properly refused to implement the kind of intentionalist perspective 
of venue provisions that has begun to erode well-established principles in 
determining where venue properly lies.31 
III. FACTS OF LOZOYA 
On a July 2015 Delta Airlines flight from Minneapolis to Los Angeles, 
Monique Lozoya settled into a middle seat in the rear of the plane with her 
boyfriend, Joshua Moffie, and another passenger, Charles Goocher, seated on 
either side of her.32  Oded Wolff sat directly behind Lozoya, while his wife 
Merav occupied the accompanying window seat.33 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1240–41 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 26. Id. at 1242. 
 27. Id. 
 28.  United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 279 (1999) (holding that the “’locus 
delicti [of the charged offense] must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the 
location of the act or acts constituting it.’” (quoting United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 
(1946))). 
 29. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1244–45. 
 30. Id. at 1243. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 1233. 
 33. Id. 
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Lozoya’s efforts to sleep during the flight were interrupted as Wolff 
repeatedly contacted her seat, an account confirmed by Goocher.34  Later in 
the flight, when Wolff and his wife left to use the restroom, Lozoya told 
Moffie that she would address the disturbance with Wolff when he came back 
to his seat.35  A turbulent exchange ensued upon Wolff’s return, as Lozoya 
claimed Wolff took exception to her request that he stop hitting her seat and 
moved his hand uncomfortably near to her face.36  Lozoya testified that fear 
and nerves provoked her to push Wolff’s face away with an open palm, 
thereby causing his nose to bleed.37  Flight attendants then defused the 
altercation and questioned the parties.38  Wolff acknowledged that he would 
meet with Lozoya at the airport following the flight and consider accepting an 
apology after hearing her perspective on the incident; nevertheless, Lozoya 
opted against meeting with Wolff, and left the airport without apologizing.39 
After being issued a violation notice charging her with assault in August 
2015, Lozoya was formally charged with a Class A misdemeanor for assault 
in February 2016, which was later adjusted to a Class B misdemeanor for 
simple assault in April 2016.40  At the bench trial, Lozoya moved for acquittal 
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 for improper venue in the 
Central District of California.41  The magistrate judge held that venue was 
proper under 18 U.S.C. §  7(a), finding that “to establish venue, the 
government only needs to prove that the crime took place on a form of 
transportation in interstate commerce.”42  The court ultimately found Lozoya 
guilty of simple assault.43  On appeal to the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California under the same claims, Lozoya’s conviction 
was affirmed, and an appeal to the Ninth Circuit followed.44 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1234. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1234–35. 
 41. Id. at 1235. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1236. 
 44. Id. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LOZOYA OPINION 
A. Judge Smith’s Opinion 
The Ninth Circuit reached the correct holding in United States v. Lozoya 
because its decision to confront—rather than avoid—the risk of reaching 
absurd results during venue determinations for offenses involving travel in 
interstate commerce faithfully adhered to the plain meaning of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3237(a). 
1. The Inapplicability and Preclusion of the First Paragraph of 18 
U.S.C. § 3238 
In brief, the Ninth Circuit was wise to give little attention to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3238 and dismiss its pertinence to the facts of Lozoya.45  Application of 18 
U.S.C. § 3238 requires that the charged offense was “begun or committed” in 
international waters or any other location outside of the jurisdiction of any 
specific U.S. state or district.46  Judge Smith was straightforward in his 
discussion on § 3238: “Here, the assault occurred entirely within the 
jurisdiction of a particular district.  It neither began nor was committed 
entirely outside the United States, and so § 3238 is inapplicable.”47 
2. The Superiority of a Textualist Reading of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) 
The crux of the disagreement between Judge Smith’s majority opinion 
and Judge Owens’s dissenting opinion concerning the applicability of 18 
U.S.C. § 3237(a) to the facts of Lozoya rests upon distinct interpretations of 
two key clauses contained within the statute: what constitutes an offense 
“involving the use of . . . transportation in interstate or foreign commerce” 
and, consequently, how this determination gives effect to the understanding 
of a “continuing offense.”48 
As previously mentioned, textualism in statutory interpretation subscribes 
 
 45. Id. at 1241. 
 46. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1948); see also O’Neill, supra note 2, at 1429. 
 47. Compare United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1241, (9th Cir. 2019), with United States v. 
Walczak, 783 F.2d 852, 855 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3238 permitted venue in the 
district in which the offender was first brought because his offense had been committed “out of the 
jurisdiction of any particular state or district”). 
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1948). 
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to the notion that statutes should be read with strict literalism and give 
precedence to the common, reasonable understanding of the words contained 
in the statute’s text.49  Meanwhile, intentionalism in statutory interpretation 
emphasizes the presumption that a rational governing body such as Congress 
would not enact legislation with the intent of creating absurd results, and 
therefore courts are justified in rejecting the plain meaning of a statute and 
imparting the supposed sensible intentions of Congress to avoid the absurd 
results that would stem from a rigid, literal reading of the same statute.50 
Where the circuit courts in Breitweiser and Cope used an intentionalist 
reading of § 3237(a) that entailed an admirable, although subjective, effort to 
implement Congress’s intent to supply a means of efficiently determining 
venue for crimes committed during flight,51 both decisions strayed from the 
sensible, superior textualist reading of § 3237(a) used by the Ninth Circuit in 
Lozoya.  An offense genuinely “involving the use of . . . transportation in 
interstate or foreign commerce” goes beyond an incidental relationship 
between the crime and the fact that transportation is present at the time of the 
crime’s commission.52  This phrase does not boil down to a crime’s 
coincidence with transportation in interstate commerce to implicate any given 
offense that took place on a form of transportation in interstate commerce.  
Instead, as Lozoya demonstrates, the offense is not always so inextricably 
bound to the use of transportation in interstate commerce so as to make it a 
“continuing offense” by definition under § 3237(a).53  Indeed, the 
transportation—the flight—in Lozoya was not at all requisite to the 
advancement or completion of the assault.  In fact, it was in no way 
contemplated as a means of successfully facilitating the crime, nor was the 
flight “involved” as a quintessential condition or circumstance of the crime.54 
Moreover, an exploration of the fundamental purpose of § 3237(a) 
 
 49. Manning, supra note 16, at 2390–91. 
 50. Id. at 2389–90. 
 51. See United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cope, 
676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 52. Compare Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1240, with Breitweiser, 357 F.3d at 1253.  But see Cope, 676 
F.3d at 1225 (finding venue to be proper in multiple districts because the defendant, a pilot, flew a 
plane under the influence of alcohol across multiple districts).  Unlike Lozoya, Cope involved an 
offense that legitimately implicated “transportation in interstate commerce.”  Id.  Lozoya’s assault was 
not an offense truly “involving the use of . . . transportation in interstate commerce” in the same 
manner as Cope because the occurrence of an assault on an airplane does not jeopardize the stability 
of air travel the same way the impairment of a pilot would. 
 53. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1240. 
 54. Id. 
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effectively reveals how the phrase “involving” relates to the relationship 
between the transportation and the crime.  Section 3237(a) was designed to 
“prevent a crime which has been committed in transit from escaping 
punishment” for lack of ascertainable venue.55  As such, it was not created to 
exert control over venue for crimes implicating transportation in interstate 
commerce for the sake of interstate commerce itself, but to prevent the fraying 
of justice for crimes that elude traditional means of pinpointing the 
commission of the crime for purposes of determining proper venue.56  
Section 3237(a) sets forth in broad strokes an ambitious vision for 
ascertaining venue, but it is not a statute that merits gap-filling when the facts 
of a given situation do not coincide with the plain meaning of the statute’s 
text.57  Broad standards for determining venue are not unconstitutional so long 
as courts take caution to properly establish parameters to the statute’s 
application.58  The commonly understood meaning of “involving” provides 
the proper parameters in this case. 
A secondary consequence of Judge Smith’s reinterpretation of what 
“involving” means within the scope of § 3237(a) was the limitation placed on 
the statute’s representation of a “continuing offense,” as well as the statute’s 
reach in providing venue across multiple districts.59  According to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3237(a), a “continuing offense” is defined as one “begun in one district and 
completed in another, or committed in more than one district,” whereas a non-
continuing offense would be one begun and committed in a single district, and 
therefore limited solely to the jurisdiction of that district.60  Upon the given 
facts, Lozoya began and completed the assault rather instantaneously.61  
Because there was no pause between the initiation, commission, and 
completion of the offense, it is likely that the assault began and terminated in 
the same single district.  In other words, there was no continuation of the 
offense into another district so as to attach to the assault the label of a 
“continuing offense” under which § 3237(a) would properly apply.62  Instead, 
 
 55. United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 350 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See O’Neill, supra note 2, at 1447. 
 58. See Staszewski, supra note 7, at 1056. 
 59. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1948). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Lozoya v. United States, 920 F.3d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 62. See United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding venue to be proper 
in multiple districts because the defendant, a pilot, flew a plane under the influence of alcohol across 
multiple districts).  As Judge Smith noted, “[o]nce the assault had concluded, any subsequent activity 
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Lozoya’s assault was a “point-in-time” offense, committed and terminated 
prior to crossing into the airspace of the Central District of California.63  
Consequently, as Judge Smith discerned, the Central District was not the 
proper venue for Lozoya’s trial. 
B. Judge Owens’s Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent 
In contrast to Judge Smith’s textualist take on 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)’s 
applicability to the venue issue in Lozoya, Judge Owens’s dissent took a 
traditional intentionalist stance when interpreting the statute’s relationship to 
the case.64  While conceding that 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) is not without 
ambiguity, he recognized the challenge posed by a stipulation to determine 
the locus delicti of the charged offense before venue may be established, as 
“[i]n this age of jet aircraft a moment of time can mean many miles have been 
traversed.”65  He argued for an intentionalist perspective on § 3237(a), 
invoking the practicality of the absurdity doctrine because the legislature 
could not have reasonably intended for the prosecution to “pinpoint the 
precise minute” when a criminal offense occurred mid-flight in order to 
properly establish venue.66 
C. Assessing The Risk of Absurdity Resulting From Application of the 
Majority’s Holding 
The decisions of Judge Smith and Judge Owens come to a head upon 
consideration of the likelihood of reaching absurd results through the 
application of the majority’s literal interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).  The 
absurdity doctrine submits that “if a particular application of a clear statute 
produces an absurd result, the Court understands itself to be a more faithful 
agent if it adjusts the statute to reflect what Congress would have intended 
 
was incidental and therefore irrelevant for venue purposes.”  Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1239. 
 63. But cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 281 (1999) (holding that “[w]here a 
crime consists of distinct parts which have different localities the whole may be tried where any part 
can be proved to have been done.” (quoting United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73 (1916))); United 
States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 910–11 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding that essential conduct elements were 
committed in multiple districts so as to properly permit venue in each of the given districts). 
 64. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1244–45. 
 65. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 87-694, at 2–3 (1961)).  
 66. Id. 
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had it confronted the putative absurdity.”67 
While Judge Smith is aware of a “creeping absurdity” resulting from a 
decision requiring prosecutors to “pinpoint” the location above which an in-
flight offense occurred so as to properly prove venue in that district, he takes 
a textualist stance in insisting that the court “cannot ignore the binding effect 
of precedent and the Constitution.”68  He does not waver from the force of 
these sources of law in suggesting that Congress might “enact a new statute 
to remedy any irrationality that might follow from our conclusion.”69  Judge 
Owens posits that “limiting venue to a ‘flyover state’” would be irrational and 
untenable for the efficiency of the legal system, because “[u]nder the 
majority’s rule, the government must prove which district—not merely which 
state—an airplane was flying over when the crime was committed.”70 
However, Judge Owens fails to account for the complex technology 
embedded in planes and the firmly-established procedures for recording flight 
data that can be comprehensibly distilled for accurate determinations of 
venue.  It is important to articulate that Judge Smith’s textualist interpretation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) is not incompatible with the absurdity doctrine—the 
principle simply does not apply when the prospect of generating absurd results 
is so speculative.71  History suggests that, “even if one rejected a free-floating 
absurdity doctrine, one could expect the judiciary’s enforcement of 
constitutional values to address many putative injustices that, in a system of 
unqualified legislative supremacy, might compel resort to principles of 
absurdity.”72 
V. IMPACT & CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit was correct to depart from the holdings of the Tenth 
and Eleventh Circuits for failure of those courts’ intentionalist interpretation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) to encompass the factual distinctions of Lozoya.  The 
Ninth Circuit’s holding bridges the gap between constitutional norms that 
formed the bedrock of venue determination procedures and a recent trend 
 
 67. Manning, supra note 16, at 2394. 
 68. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1243. 
 69. Id.  This very recommendation contradicts the opinion that “the absence of such a doctrine 
might compel Congress to legislate at an excessive level of detail, thereby raising the procedural costs 
of bargaining over legislation.”  Manning, supra note 16, at 2438. 
 70. Id. at 1244–45. 
 71. See Dougherty, supra note 4, at 159. 
 72. Manning, supra note 16, at 2393. 
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towards permitting venue based on unrefined standards of what constitutes a 
“continuing offense” or an offense “involving the use of . . . transportation in 
interstate commerce.”  The Lozoya decision is especially significant because 
it confronted circumstances that did not easily lend to precedential definitions 
of such terms, and therefore exercised statutory interpretation that was faithful 
to well-settled traditions of venue law without heeding to the accessible but 
superficial understanding of § 3237(a) that has recently guided courts.73 
This is not to say that challenges will not arise from this decision; 
nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Lozoya was a demonstration of the 
court putting its foot down on a pattern of overinclusive statutory 
interpretation threatening to disturb the balance of power between the 
legislature and the judiciary.  Concerns of reaching absurd results under the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision, while not entirely impractical, are outweighed by the 
advancements in statutory interpretation made during the court’s deliberation.  
“[A]bsurdity, being apparently more a common-sense concept than a legal 
one, is arguably no more within the special knowledge and training of the 
legal community than it is within the common knowledge and instinct of the 
community at large.”74  The Ninth Circuit was prudent to prioritize and 
embrace common sense in reaching a decision in accord with society’s 
common understanding of the relationship between a crime and the tangential 
circumstance of transportation in interstate commerce.  Instead of stepping on 
the toes of Congress based upon a presumption of its legislative intent, the 
Ninth Circuit shrewdly left the door open to Congress to readdress and refine 
statutes such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3237(a) and 3238 to satisfactorily provide venue 




 73. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1239–41. 
 74. Dougherty, supra note 4, at 163. 
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